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Attention is a key process used to conceptualize and define modes of thought, but we
lack information about the role of specific attentional processes on preferential choice and
memory in multi-attribute decision making. In this study, we examine the role of attention
based on two dimensions, attentional scope and load on choice preference strength and
memory using a paradigm that arguably elicits unconscious thought. Scope of attention
was manipulated by using global or local processing during distraction (Experiment 1) and
before the information-encoding stage (Experiment 2). Load was manipulated by using the
n-back task in Experiment 1. Results from Experiment 1 show that global processing or
distributed attention during distraction results in stronger preference irrespective of load
but better memory only at low cognitive load.Task difficulty or load did not have any effect
on preference or memory. In Experiment 2, distributed attention before attribute encoding
facilitated only memory but did not influence preference. Results show that attentional
processes at different stages of processing like distraction and information-encoding influ-
ence decision making processes. Scope of attention not only influences preference and
memory but the manner in which attentional scope influences them depends on both load
and stage of information processing. The results indicate the important role of attention
in processes critical for decision making and calls for a re-evaluation of the unconscious
thought theory (UTT) and the need for reconceptualizing the role of attention.
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INTRODUCTION
Life is mostly about choices. From choosing to buy a car or a choco-
late to a house or a pen, choices are diverse. A large number of stud-
ies on decision making assume that cognition involves two hypoth-
esized modes of thought (Sloman, 2002; Kahneman, 2011) – a fast,
less controlled, and intuitive System 1 and a slow, controlled, and
deliberate System 2 (Stanovich and West, 2002; Kahneman, 2011).
Deliberation requires more cognitive and attentional resources but
is classically thought to be more dependable for complex decisions
(Christoff et al., 2011). Some have argued that the two modes of
intuition and deliberation underlie a continuum in decision mak-
ing (Hammond et al., 1987). These modes might be required and
used according to the problem at hand (Ariely and Norton, 2011).
For instance, deciding in situations when self-protection or sexual
jealously is prominent requires too little thinking, while choosing
a job or car requires deliberation. In many demanding naturalistic
contexts however, intuitive decisions yield significant advantages
wherein people use prior experience to rapidly categorize situa-
tions (e.g., Klein, 2008). In many real life situations like managerial
decision making, neither thinking too much nor thinking too little
is advantageous. In fact most managers err in choosing one over
the other (Ariely and Norton, 2011).
Contrary to classical wisdom, Unconscious Thought Theory
(UTT) proposes that compared to conscious careful delibera-
tion, normatively better decisions for complex multi-attribute
problems are made following “unconscious thought” (UT; Dijk-
sterhuis,2004; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren,2006; Dijksterhuis et al.,
2006, 2009). Even the strength of preference measured by subtract-
ing the average rating of the three lower rated options from the
one rated highest for the chosen alternative is higher following
UT (Dijksterhuis and van Olden, 2006). UTT theorists suggest
we should think less and depend on the powerful unconscious
for making complex decisions (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Such exciting
messages of clearly opting for “thinking too little” and asking the
“unconscious to deal with it” must be treated with caution and
require much more clarification. For instance, it is not clear what
is actually meant by “unconscious” in this context.
According to UTT, unconscious thought (UT) is defined as
object-relevant or task-relevant cognitive or affective thought
processes that occur while attention is directed elsewhere (Dijk-
sterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). In a typical UTT paradigm, at
first, information is presented in the encoding stage. This is
followed by a period of conscious, unconscious, or immediate
thought. Conscious thought involves carefully attending to the
problem and deliberating over it, while unconscious thought is
elicited when distracted by an unrelated task. Immediate thought
occurs when one has to decide immediately after the informa-
tion is presented. During distraction, attention is supposed to be
directed away from the problem,resulting in deliberation-without-
attention.
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 37 | 1
Srinivasan et al. Attentional scope influences decision processes
Although some studies have found supportive evidence for the
superiority of unconscious thought (e.g., Ham et al., 2009; Usher
et al., 2011), quite a few attempts to replicate the unconscious
thought effect have failed (Lerouge, 2009; Newell et al., 2009; Rey
et al., 2009; Thorsteinson and Withrow, 2009; Waroquier et al.,
2010; Newell and Rakow, 2011). Some have also argued for alter-
nate explanations (Calvillo and Penaloza, 2009; Lassiter et al.,
2009; Srinivasan and Mukherjee, 2010). Conflicting evidence has
resulted in controversies on the advantages of intuition versus
deliberation (Kahneman and Klein, 2009) and unconscious versus
conscious modes of thought (Newell and Rakow, 2011).
However, note that in all these debates, the primary concern
is whether unconscious mode of thought is superior to conscious
deliberation. None of these studies discuss the nature of processes
like attention during the unconscious thought. Hence, in order to
understand the role of attention in the decision making process,
it is necessary to go beyond whether attention is present or absent
and which mode of thought is normatively superior. Although
UT theorists claim that attention is directed elsewhere during a
distracter task, it remains to be determined if different types of
attentional processes employed in various modes of thought or
during distraction matter. Additionally, our later responses and
memory can also be influenced by the stages of processing (such
as information presentation versus distraction) at which different
attentional mechanisms could be employed. Could there be differ-
ences in attentional mechanisms based on the type of distraction
task? Can the results be influenced by the type and timing of atten-
tional strategies employed? Can attentional processes modulate
other mechanisms such as preference or memory?
Attention is a crucial cognitive process that affects preferences
and choices (Mukherjee and Srinivasan, 2013). Attention can be
qualitatively conceptualized either as a resource weighted as more
or less (Kahneman,1973),or as differences in scope rated as narrow
or wide (Srinivasan et al., 2009; Förster and Dannenberg, 2010).
The choices we make and preferences we form can be biased by
manipulating relative visual attention to the alternatives (Armel
et al., 2008). However, the role of attentional scope on different
stages of decision making (such as pre versus post-information
acquisition) remain largely unknown. A survey of the literature
reveals that the specific role of attentional processes or manipula-
tions during unconscious thought has not been examined to date,
and is therefore the focus of our study.
An important aspect of attention is its scope that determines
the number of items selected for further processing. Focusing
or narrowing attention via local processing versus distributing
or widening attention via global processing affects many cogni-
tive and emotional processes differently (Förster and Dannenberg,
2010; Srivastava and Srinivasan, 2010; Srinivasan and Gupta, 2011;
Förster and Denzler, 2012b). Global processing has been shown to
be associated with a promotion focus with eager approach strate-
gies (Förster and Higgins, 2005), higher liking for atypical objects
(Förster and Denzler, 2012a), positive moods (Gasper and Clore,
2002), and better processing of happy faces (Srinivasan and Hanif,
2010; Srinivasan and Gupta, 2011). Measures associated with scope
of attention have been linked to filtering abilities of items and
working memory capacity (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004; Cowan,
2005). Changes in scope of attention affect memory (Macrae and
Lewis, 2002; Cowan, 2005; Srinivasan and Gupta, 2011) and other
cognitive processes including intelligence (Cowan et al., 2006).
Scope of attention can be manipulated with global or local pro-
cessing using hierarchical composite stimuli, which consist of a
large or global letter made up of identical small or local letters
(Navon, 1977). In the global task, participants have to identify the
large letter and in the local task they have to identify the small letter.
Attention is also conceived in terms of the amount of resources
needed to perform a given task. Tasks vary in terms of difficulty
and hence in terms of attentional resources needed to perform the
task. Task difficulty has been shown to influence processes associ-
ated with judgment and decision making (Sprenger et al., 2011).
One way of manipulating task difficulty would be to use tasks
that differentially load working memory using the n-back tasks
(Smith and Jonides, 1998) with the zero-back task loading the cog-
nitive system (working memory) less compared to the two-back
task, which require maintaining two items in working memory
and updating them on a trial-by-trial basis. This load manipula-
tion can be orthogonally combined with the scope of attention
manipulation resulting in four different task conditions.
In the current study, we have investigated the potential role of
global versus local attention as well as low versus high load dur-
ing distraction (hypothesized to generate unconscious thought)
on choice preferences and memory. We predicted that the scope of
attention used during the distraction period would have a direct
bearing on the nature of decisions and memory. We hypothesized
that a global task during distraction results in higher strength
of preference given its link with promotion focus (Förster and
Higgins, 2005) and liking atypical objects (Förster and Denzler,
2012a). If task difficulty of the distraction task is a critical factor
and exhausts mental resources, then one would expect better pref-
erence with the low load compared to the high load task according
to the classical view which regards attentional resources critical to
make a complex decision with many informational attributes but
not according to UTT (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006).
Both the distraction task and the encoding stage can poten-
tially affect memory of the choice alternatives. Memory-related
processes have been proposed to explain some of the effects asso-
ciated with UT and play an important role in decision making
(Shanks, 2006; Lassiter et al., 2009). Memory may be affected by the
type and timing of attentional strategies employed during distrac-
tion (UT). In general, consolidation in memory is faster for tasks
that involve distributing attention over a large number of items
(Baijal and Srinivasan, 2011). Given that items that are attended
to, get privileged access (McElree, 2006), selected items become
more active in working memory and receive additional processing.
Enhanced processing of the selected items should enable people
to remember them better. With increase in scope of attention, one
can expect more items or attributes to be selected and benefited
from additional processing. We therefore predicted that partici-
pants performing a global task would have better memory of the
information presented compared to those who perform a local
task. In terms of load, if attentional resources are not necessary
for unconscious thought (distraction) as it does not have lim-
ited capacity like conscious thought or most of the encoding is
performed online, then load would not affect memory of the
attributes. However, if attentional resources (more or less) are
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critical for processing during distraction, then we would expect
load to influence memory such that low load results in better
memory compared to the high load condition.
Proponents of UTT further suggest that distraction improves
decision quality because UT occurs after information is presented
and is off-line (Strick et al., 2010). However, other researchers
have suggested that decisions are taken during information pre-
sentation in the encoding phase, implying judgments are online
(Lassiter et al., 2009) and distraction does not improve decisions
(Newell et al., 2009; Waroquier et al., 2010). If decisions are made
based only on online information processing, then manipulating
attention during the distraction period must not affect strength
of preference for the choice. However, even if decisions are taken
primarily online, a time interval post-information presentation
(regarded as distraction period in UTT) can affect memory of the
choice alternatives. The scope of attention can also affect encoding
of information itself. Thus, by manipulating the scope of atten-
tion both during the distracter task and before the presentation
of attribute information, it is possible to examine how decision
making and memory processes function both during and after
encoding. In experiment 1, we measure the effect of manipulat-
ing scope and load during distraction (unconscious thought) after
presentation of attribute information and in experiment 2, we
investigate the effects of attentional scope before the presentation
and encoding of attribute information.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants were engaged in a global or local task that was either
easy (low load) or difficult (high load) during the distraction
period when UT was supposed to occur according to UTT. Instead
of conflating both attention and consciousness, it is possible to
manipulate attention without necessarily manipulating conscious-
ness (Srinivasan and Mukherjee, 2010). This manipulation would
also allow us to compare the effects of attentional scope (global ver-
sus local processing) as well as task difficulty (low versus high load)
during distraction on preferential choice and encoding of informa-
tion. We expected better preference and memory with global com-
pared to local task during distraction. In addition, if we assume
distractor task difficulty would reduce preference and memory
then values would be lower with the two-back compared to the
zero-back task due to increased interference to memory in a high
load task (according to the classical view). Note that according to
UTT, one would hypothesize that a more difficult task would result
in increase of preference strength as distracting more away from
the problem results in better quality of decisions according to UTT
theorists. More importantly,differences due to scope or load would
imply that attentional strategies employed during the distraction
period of UT modulate the primary judgment or choice task.
METHOD
Participants
Eighty nine naïve adults with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision from Allahabad, India participated in the experiment. Each
person was paid a nominal amount for participating in the study.
Stimuli and apparatus
The hierarchical stimuli (Navon, 1977) used in the global task con-
sisted of S, H, 6, and 9 at the global level with eight at the local
level. Similarly, the stimuli used in the local task contained S, H, 6,
and 9 at the local level with eight at the global level. Global letters
subtended 3.7˚× 5.5˚ while local letters subtended 0.35˚× 0.65˚.
Stimuli were presented on a monitor and response was obtained
using the key board.
Procedure
Participants were provided with four cell phones, namely X1, X2,
X3, and X4. The decision involved choosing the best cell phone
out of the four and rating all of them. Although we were not
interested in the normative quality of choice, we asked partici-
pants to judge the best cell phone: (i) so that we could measure
preference strength and (ii) because unconscious thought is goal-
directed (Bos et al., 2008). Also, note that we do not discuss the
normative best decision but rather calculate the dependent mea-
sures based on the subjective ratings of the participants. Most
experimenters in the UTT studies (e.g., Nordgen et al., 2011)
ignore subjective idiosyncratic weights (but see Newell et al., 2009;
Usher et al., 2011) that have recently been argued to be a major
concern for replication of findings based on UTT (Newell and
Shanks, in press). Following the paradigm used in UTT experi-
ments, participants were told that they would be provided with
12 attributes of each cell phone. Based on the information, par-
ticipants would first form an impression about each cell phone,
and later rate each of the phones. Presence or absence of each
attribute in the four cell phones was tabulated in a row and
each attribute row was separately presented to the participants
for 15 s each (see Table 1 for the attribute information for the
cell phones). The total presentation time for the 12 attributes
was 3 min.
After the information presentation stage, participants were
asked to perform either a global or a local task for 3 min and
then judge the cell phones (see Figure 1). There were four dif-
ferent between-subjects task conditions: global zero-back, local
zero-back, global two-back, and local two-bask conditions. The
hierarchical letters were shown consecutively for 500 ms at the
center of the screen followed by a blank screen for 500 ms. In both
the global and local zero-back tasks, participants were asked to
count the number of times “S” appeared on the screen (ranging
Table 1 | Dataset used in the study indicating the presence or absence
of attributes for all the four cell phones.
Attribute X1 X2 X3 X4
MP3 player 1 −1 1 −1
Camera zoom −1 1 −1 −1
FM radio 1 1 1 −1
Track ID −1 1 −1 −1
Video recording 1 −1 1 1
Email −1 1 −1 1
Video playback −1 −1 1 1
GPS −1 −1 −1 1
MMS −1 1 1 1
3G −1 1 1 1
Flight mode −1 −1 −1 1
TV output −1 −1 −1 1
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 37 | 3
Srinivasan et al. Attentional scope influences decision processes
FIGURE 1 | Block diagram schematic of the order of different stages in Experiment 1 and 2.
between 30 and 60 times). In the two-back global and local tasks,
participants were asked to count the number of times the current
letter (at the appropriate level) is the same as the one presented
two trials before the current trial. The range of occurrences was
similar for both the zero-back and two-back tasks. At the end, par-
ticipants were asked the following on a sheet of paper: (1) Please
rate the cell phones shown (X1, X2, X3, X4) on a scale of 0–100
where 0 is worst and 100 is best. (2) Which is the best cell phone
according to you? (3) Try to recollect as many attributes you can
and state whether they were present (+) or absent (−) for each of
the cell phones. Note that the participants did not know that they
would be asked a question related to memory so that memory-
based processes (Lassiter et al., 2009) and unconscious thought
processes are not conflated.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Data from seven participants had to be rejected since they had
chosen an item but rated another as the best and two participants
were rejected due to very poor performance in the two-back task.
In our study, we tried to keep the task difficulty and performance
in the global and local tasks to be close to each other so that the
differences in global and local conditions can be attributed to dif-
ferences in scope of attention and not to task difficulty per se. In
terms of performance in the global-local zero-back task, partici-
pants were accurate in both the global and local conditions with
a mean error of 1.9 and 1.3% respectively. In the two-back task,
the error rates in the global and local conditions were 37.18 and
38.31% respectively. We obtained a Bayes factor of 0.11 for the
performance difference between global and local zero-back tasks
providing strong evidence for the null (Dienes, 2008; Rouder et al.,
2009). With the two-back global and local tasks, we obtain a Bayes
factor of 0.57 indicating that sufficient evidence is not present to
reject the null hypothesis. The results suggest that there is no dif-
ference in task difficulty between the corresponding global and
local zero-back and two-bask task conditions. This suggests the
task difficulty for the global and local tasks are similar for a given
working memory load.
Chi-square analysis of the choices made showed that there was
no significant difference in the actual choice made between the
global and local conditions in both the zero-back and two-back
tasks respectively. Based on the conflicting results obtained in UT
studies and lack of a reliable effect even when conscious thought
was compared to UT (Newell et al., 2009), it is not surprising that
we did not obtain a reliable difference for the choice made when
the nature of distraction task was manipulated.
We performed a two variable between-subjects ANOVA with
scope and load as the variables on strength of preference, mem-
ory for all attributes, and memory for attributes of the preferred
choice. Strength of Preference was calculated by subtracting the
average rating of the three least rated cell phones from the one rated
highest (Dijksterhuis and van Olden, 2006; Lassiter et al., 2009).
Results for preference strength and memory for both the global and
local conditions in the two different load conditions are shown in
Figure 2. As predicted, the results showed a significant main effect
for scope, F(1, 76)= 11.881, p= 0.001 with better strength of pref-
erence for global compared to local distractor task conditions. The
effect of load (p= 0.117) and interaction between load and scope
(p= 0.794) was not significant. Planned comparisons showed that
participants performing the global zero-back task had signifi-
cantly higher strength of preference than those who performed
the local zero-back task, t (38)= 2.7, p= 0.0111. Moving to the
1We also performed Bayesian analysis (Rouder et al., 2009) and computed the Unit
Bayes factor (BF) for the three dependent measures (with r= 1) comparing the dif-
ferences between global and local processing conditions under low load and high
load conditions. All the BF values reported in the paper are evidence for the alter-
native with respect to the null hypothesis. High BF values (much greater than 1)
indicate evidence for the alternative hypothesis and low BF values (much less than
1) indicate evidence for the null hypothesis. The BF for the strength of preference
difference between global and local processing conditions was 6.62 providing strong
support for the alternative hypothesis, that strength of preference is different in the
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FIGURE 2 | Strength of preference as a function of scope of attention
and load in Experiment 1.
two-back task, the global condition once again had significantly
better strength of preference, t (38)= 2.17, p= 0.036 compared
to the local condition. The difference in strength of preference
between the low and high load tasks for the global, t (38)= 0.972,
p= 0.337 and local conditions, t (38)= 1.417, p= 0.165 was not
significant.
In terms of total memory performance (see Figure 3) with
the zero-back, the main effect of scope was significant, F(1,
76)= 6.474, p= 0.013. The effect of load was not significant
(p= 0.834). The interaction between load and scope was close
to significance, F(1, 76)= 3.705, p= 0.058. The analysis with the
memory for attributes of the chosen item showed that the main
effects of load (p= 0.734) and scope (p= 0.247) was not signifi-
cant. The interaction between load and scope was not significant
(p= 0.168). Planned comparisons show that the percentage of
correct entries was significantly higher in the global compared
to the local zero-back task, t (38)= 2.83, p= 0.007. The differ-
ence between the percentage of correct entries for the chosen cell
phone (preferred choice memory) for the global and local zero-
back tasks was also statistically significant, t (38)= 1.99, p= 0.05.
We also compared the percentage of correct entries for all the
items with that for the preferred choice between corresponding
scope and load conditions. Enhanced memory performance for the
chosen item (see Figure 4) was statistically significant in both the
global, t (19)= 2.663, p= 0.015 and local, t (19)= 2.884, p= 0.009
zero-back task conditions. With the more difficult two-back task
global compared to the local conditions. The BF for the difference in strength of
preference between global and local tasks with the two-back task was 2.37. In terms
of total memory performance with the zero-back, the BF for the difference between
the global compared to the local task was 9.09. The BF for the difference between
preferred choice memory for the global and local zero-back tasks was 1.733. With
the more difficult two-back task conditions, the BF for the difference in total and
preferred choice memory performance between the global and local conditions was
0.339 and 0.305 respectively.
FIGURE 3 |Total memory as a function of scope of attention and load
in Experiment 1.
FIGURE 4 | Choice memory as a function of scope of attention and
load in Experiment 1.
conditions, there was no significant difference in total and pre-
ferred choice memory performance between the global and local
conditions (p> 0.5). The difference in total memory performance
between the low and high load tasks for the global, t (38)= 1.82,
p= 0.08, and local conditions, t (38)= 1.06, p= 0.296 was not sig-
nificant. The difference in choice memory performance between
the low and high load tasks for the global, t (38)= 1.205, p= 0.206,
and local conditions, t (38)= 0.757, p= 0.454 was also not sig-
nificant. However, the memory for attributes of the chosen
item compared to total memory was better in the two-back
global, t (19)= 2.203, p= 0.04, and local, t (19)= 3.502, p= 0.002
conditions.
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The strength of preference was clearly better with global com-
pared to the local task conditions. The effect was present under
both the easy (low working memory load) and difficult (high
working memory load) conditions of the distraction task and
thus load itself did not have an effect on strength of preference.
The effect of scope of attention on preference may be due to the
link between (low-approach) positive motivational or emotional
stimuli (Gable and Harman-Jones, 2010) and distributed atten-
tion (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005; Srivastava and Srinivasan,
2010; Srinivasan and Gupta, 2011). In addition, as distributing
attention or global processing is linked to an approach motivation
(Förster and Higgins, 2005) and greater likings for atypical objects
(Förster and Denzler, 2012a), it appears that by distributing atten-
tion, preference strength for the chosen alternatives increases as
we had previously hypothesized.
One may try to argue that the difference in preference due to
scope of attention might also be due to task difficulty with local
processing being possibly more difficult than global processing
(Navon, 1977). If task difficulty is the critical factor, then one
would expect that the strength of preference for the two-back task
to be much lower than the values for the zero-back conditions
according to the classical understanding as more difficult tasks
should cause more interference in processing. We did not find an
effect for task difficulty on preference strength although the low
load task was much easier than the high load task. While the differ-
ence between corresponding global and local tasks under different
load conditions was not significant, the values were actually a bit
higher with the more difficult two-back task conditions compared
to the zero-back conditions. This needs to be contrasted with the
difference between global and local conditions in which preference
for the global task is more than that of the local task. The results
indicate that the effect on strength of preference is not due to task
difficulty per se but due to differences in scope of attention. The
nature of the difficulty of the distractor task did not matter and
if at all there is a trend, difficulty appears to increase preference
strength rather than decrease it.
Unlike the effects on the strength of preference, the memory
performance shows that the effect of scope of attention is prob-
ably modulated by load. Memory is better for global compared
to local only when a low load easier (zero-back) distractor task is
performed and enough resources are available. With the more dif-
ficult high load task, scope does not matter. A plausible explanation
for better memory is that distributed attention during distrac-
tion enables selection of more items either during distraction or
retrieval but only when enough cognitive resources are available.
These results clearly indicate that the type or scope of attention
during distraction significantly affects processes associated with
both choice preference and memory but the influence differs based
on the availability or non-availability of attentional resources (not)
utilized by the distractor task.
The differences in the influence of scope in the context of dif-
ferent amounts of load indicate that the effects on preference and
memory are driven through different mechanisms. In comparison
to focused attention, the effects of distributed attention on pref-
erence and memory can be attributed either to selection of items
during distraction (or UT), or to the lingering effects of attentional
strategies during retrieval but enough resources are needed for the
differing attentional mechanisms to influence memory of attrib-
utes. The results do clearly indicate that the preference effects are
due to differences in the scope of attention between global or local
processing given the fact that the more difficult two-back task did
not seem to decrease preference at all (it is to be noted that the
accuracy of the global and local tasks in our study are similar).
EXPERIMENT 2
One issue that has been debated in the context of UT and deci-
sion making is whether the processes involved occur during and
after the distracter task (off-line) or during the presentation of
attribute information (online) before the distracter task (Lassiter
et al., 2009; Waroquier et al., 2009; Strick et al., 2010). If the
decision is taken during attribute presentation stage itself, then
decision processes (and preference strength) could be influenced
by performing the global-local task before encoding. Given that
both preference and memory effects for scope of attention are
present only for the zero-back task condition, we focus primar-
ily on the low load zero-back task condition in this experiment.
In addition, previous studies have shown that performing a more
difficult task like the ones that require exertion of self-control
results in reduction of efficiency of control processes (Baumeis-
ter et al., 2007). The memory effect due to scope of attention
under low load may be more general. We hypothesized that if
a global task results in larger selection of attribute informa-
tion then it could enhance memory and thereby suggest that
scope of attention affects encoding itself. Hence, in our second
experiment a global-local task was assigned to the participants
prior to giving them any information about the choice alterna-
tives. Upon completion of the task, participants were presented
with choice alternatives, asked to rate the cell phones immedi-
ately, and probed for memory of the attributes, as in Experiment
1. We used only the zero-back task since both preference and




Forty naïve adults with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
from Allahabad were selected for this study, and paid a nominal
amount for participating in the experiment.
Stimuli and apparatus
All the stimuli and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were first assigned a global or a local zero-back task.
They were then presented with attribute information for the four
cell phones, as in Experiment 1a (see Figure 1). After information
presentation, participants were asked to immediately rate all the
four cell phones, choose the best cell phone (immediate mode of
thought according to UTT) and finally, they were asked to recall
the attribute information.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Data from one participant was excluded from the analysis because
of the presence of an outlier (>2.5 standard deviation) in the
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total memory measure2. As in Experiment 1, the performance
in the global and local tasks was accurate, with non-significant
error percentages of 0.76% and 1.8% respectively. The Bayes fac-
tor was 1.18 which does not provide sufficient evidence to reject
the null hypothesis (no difference in performance between global
and local tasks). Chi-square tests indicated no significant differ-
ence in the actual choices made in the global or local conditions.
Strength of preference and memory performance for all the items
as well as the preferred item in Experiment 2 is shown in Figure 5.
The strength of preference was not significantly different between
the global and the local task groups, t (37)= 0.415, p= 0.683.
However, the percentage of total correct entries recalled was sig-
nificantly more for the global task group compared to the local
task group, t (37)= 2.213, p= 0.033. In addition, the percentage
of correct entries for the chosen item recalled accurately was also
significantly more for the global compared to the local group,
t (37)= 2.49, p= 0.017. The memory for attributes of the chosen
item compared to all the items was better in the global condition,
t (18)= 3.174, p= 0.005 but not significantly different in the local
condition, t (19)= 1.43, p= 0.169.
Our results clearly demonstrate that global-local processing
before encoding of attribute information about choices affects
memory. These findings suggest that the type of attention
primes information acquisition. Distributed attention resulted in
2The outlier participant had values of 31.25% for attributes of all items (total mem-
ory) and 50% for memory of attributes for the chosen item. Statistical analysis
performed by retaining the outlier makes the effect of scope of attention on total
memory non-significant, t (38)= 1.576, p= 0.12 with the trend remaining the same
(global= 73.8%, local= 66%). The effect of scope of attention on memory for
attributes of the chosen item remains significant, t (38)= 2.08, p= 0.04.
3The BF for the strength of preference between the global and the local task groups
was 0.330 indicating strong evidence for the null, that is there is no difference in
strength of preference between the global and local conditions. The BF for the per-
centage of total correct entries in the global task group compared to the local task
group was 2.565. The BF for the preferred choice memory in the global task com-
pared to the local task condition was 4.316 indicating a strong evidence that memory
is better in the global compared to the local group.
selection of more items that resulted in better memory possi-
bly because attended items get comparatively more access (Vogel
and Machizawa, 2004; McElree, 2006). However, unlike Experi-
ment 1, the scope of attention did not affect preference strength.
This indicates that some amount of time might be needed
for building preference for a particular choice specifically dur-
ing distraction that could be influenced by differences in scope
of attention associated with the distractor task. The results do
clearly indicate that the processes underlying the effect of atten-
tion on preference and memory are possibly different. Taken
together the results of Experiment 1 and 2 indicate that at
least the effect on choice preference is due to the manipula-
tion of the type of attention during distraction (UT) and hence
not all decision making processes are purely online (or com-
pleted during information acquisition). It is also possible that
a distraction period serves an updating role on previous choice
processes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of both the experiments show that scope of attention
affects memory and preference. However, the effects of scope of
attention on these two factors differ. These results suggest that the
effects of attentional scope on preference strength and memory
may be mediated by different processes, and a delay or distrac-
tion is necessary in between information presentation and the
choice for preference strength but not for memory. The effect
of scope of attention on strength of preference was seen only in
Experiment 1, where attention was manipulated during distrac-
tion. The lack of effect on preference in Experiment 2 suggests
that a time interval after encoding is necessary to affect prefer-
ence strengths triggered by attention strategies during distraction.
Furthermore, better memory alone is not sufficient to drive pref-
erence strength: globally primed participants have better memory
although strength of preference remains unaffected, in Experiment
2. The positive effect of global attention during distraction on pref-
erence strength for the chosen item may be due to the association
FIGURE 5 | (A) Strength of preference, (B) total memory, and (C) choice memory as a function of scope of attention in Experiment 2.
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between global processing and positive emotions (Srinivasan and
Hanif, 2010; Srinivasan and Gupta, 2011) and/or an approach
orientation (Förster and Higgins, 2005). Scope of attention influ-
enced preference but task difficulty per se (in terms of load) did
not influence preference. The fact that there is no decrease in pref-
erence (trend was in the opposite direction) as a function of task
difficulty but there is a difference between global and local atten-
tion indicates that the effect on preference is likely due to the
motivational or emotional differences associated with differences
in scope of attention (Förster and Higgins, 2005; Srinivasan and
Hanif, 2010; Srinivasan and Gupta, 2011).
Earlier studies on memory have linked larger scope of attention
to larger working memory capacity and better cognitive process-
ing (Cowan, 2005; Cowan et al., 2006) that presumably enable
selection of a larger number of items and better processing of
selected items (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004). We show that the
scope of attention can be manipulated using a perceptual task that
can consequently alter memory performance for the attributes of
given choices when sufficient resources are available. In addition,
the amount of resources utilized by the distractor task as a function
of task difficulty is important for the effect of attentional scope on
memory with global attention enhancing memory only under low
load conditions. As evident from Experiment 2, when the scope
of attention is induced by an easier global-local task, the effects
persist for at least a few minutes.
Our findings have significant implications on UTT. The results
of both our experiments suggest that studies on directing atten-
tion away from the decision making task are far from complete.
Scope of attention during distraction affects both preference for-
mation and memory, but preference irrespective of task difficulty
and memory when the distractor task is an easy task. Previous
studies have paid little attention to the kind of processing actually
performed during UT, assuming it simply to be a way of direct-
ing attention elsewhere. However, the results of our studies clearly
show that the kind of processing performed during distraction
affects the nature of processes involved in our judgments on affec-
tive quality and memory. We agree with Simonson (2005) that the
manipulations spearheaded by Dijksterhuis and colleagues can
shed light in various real life scenarios like consumer decisions.
However, we feel that there is an urgent need to investigate the
processes that occur during UT (perhaps as a function of the dis-
tractor task itself) rather than argue over whether unconscious or
conscious thought is better.
Attention is not unitary and cannot be simply treated as a
dichotomous variable that may or may not be present in thought
processes. Manipulation of the scope of attention by global and
local processing can produce different effects on the decision
about an unrelated item. While attentional mechanisms might
differ between conscious and unconscious thought, the defini-
tion of unconscious thought as “thought without attention or
with attention directed elsewhere” as proposed by Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren (2006), is probably incomplete: UT itself is affected
by consciously controlled attentional strategies. The concept of
“UT” as thought without attention ignores the fact that attentional
processes themselves can differ.
Our results suggest that while scope of attention manipulated
either before encoding or during distraction improves memory
(but only in the context of the low load task), broad scope of
attention increases preference only during distraction. According
to UTT, explicit memory of attributes and the choice strength need
not be positively correlated as the “unconscious” should lead to
automatic weighting. However, we found that following a period
of distraction in the global task condition, participants had greater
preference strength for the choice. This observation raises the
question on whether distraction is essentially “distracted conscious
thought ” rather than “unconscious thought.” To our knowledge,
there is no evidence yet that distracting attention via an unrelated
task as in typical UT studies promotes “unconscious” processing
(also see Aczel et al., 2011). The operationalization of uncon-
scious thought slips from using the resource view of attention
to comment on consciousness, and UT theorists have conflated
both attention and consciousness in the process (Srinivasan and
Mukherjee, 2010). We know that attention and consciousness are
dissociable as distinct processes (Lamme, 2003; Srinivasan, 2008;
van Boxtel et al., 2010), and therefore the individual roles of each
in decision making requires more critical evaluation.
Instead of arguing whether unconscious or conscious thought
results in better memory consolidation (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006;
Shanks, 2006), we show the necessity of comparing different types
of pre- and post-information acquisition periods on memory for
the attributes. Both the global and local task can be conceived as
periods of “thinking away from the problem”: the memory effects
produced vary with the types of distractions or UT tasks. Although
we do not argue that decisions are taken online or off-line, our
results show that the affective quality of judgments is definitely
affected by both distraction/UT and processes during informa-
tion presentation. These findings suggest complementary roles for
both online and off-line mechanisms.
Further studies about the nature of processing before and after
information-encoding would go a long way in fully understanding
the way we make complex decisions. For example, it is important
to consider the mechanisms involved in preference strength gen-
eration and examine the mediating roles of explicit and implicit
memory on preference constructions. We also need to understand
the temporal dynamics of both choice preference stabilizations and
the effects of attentional scope on memory retrieval. Moreover,
as pointed out earlier, it is possible that memory and preference
can be mediated and facilitated by different cognitive effects. We
agree with Nordgen et al. (2011), who suggested that complex
decisions are a product of interrelated mechanisms including pos-
sible integration of conscious and unconscious modes. We believe
that processes differing in attentional mechanisms, memory and
heuristics are based on an underlying continuum in decision
making.
It is important to recognize that scope of attention is a fun-
damental factor that can influence various types of daily deci-
sion making. To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies
to show that global versus local perception can affect consumer
decision related processes, especially preference strength in con-
sumer judgments. However, our study is only suggestive of the
whole range of questions concerning the role of attention in deci-
sion making. Thus far, the role of attentional scope is relatively
obscure in theoretical treatments of judgment and decision mak-
ing. Narrow versus wide scope as measured by global versus local
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perceptual tasks can affect both “regulatory focus” or the way we
approach a problem (Förster and Higgins, 2005) and the later judg-
ments we form (Liberman and Förster, 2009; Förster and Denzler,
2012a). Scope of attention might also interact with the amount
of attention during a choice problem. Further studies investigat-
ing scope versus amount of attention could help us understand
newer intricacies of processing different modes of thought that,
in turn, will shed more light on the role played by attention in
decision making. More importantly, decision making also needs
to be viewed in the light of attentional scope or strategies instead
of only treating attention as a resource that aids selection of
information.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the Editor, Ben Newell and the other two
reviewers for their helpful comments. We thank Mukesh Makwana
for helping us with data collection and Zoltan Dienes for help with
computing the Bayes factor.
REFERENCES
Aczel, B., Lukacs, B., Komlos, J., and
Aitken, M. R. F. (2011). Unconscious
intuition or conscious analysis? Crit-
ical questions for the deliberation-
without-attention paradigm. Judgm.
Decis. Mak. 6, 351–358.
Ariely, D., and Norton, M. I. (2011).
From thinking too little to thinking
too much: a continuum of decision
making. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Cogn.
Sci. 2, 39–46.
Armel, C. K., Beaumel, A., and Rangel,
A. (2008). Biasing simple choices
by manipulating relative visual
attention. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 3,
396–403.
Baijal, S., and Srinivasan, N. (2011).
Consolidation of statistical informa-
tion of multiple objects in working
memory. Atten. Percept. Psychophys.
73, 1733–1741.
Baumeister, R. F., and Vohs, K. D., and
Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength
model of self-control. Curr. Dir. Psy-
chol. Sci. 16, 351–355.
Bos, M. W., Dijksterhuis, A., and
van Baaren, R. B. (2008). On
the goal-dependency of unconscious
thought. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 44,
1114–1120.
Calvillo, D. P., and Penaloza, A. (2009).
Are complex decisions better left
to the unconscious? Further failed
replications of the deliberation-
without-attention effect. Judgm.
Decis. Mak. 4, 509–517.
Christoff, K., Gordon, A., and Smith,
R. (2011). “The role of spontaneous
thought in human cognition,” in
Neuroscience of Decision Making, eds
O. Vartanian and D. R. Mandel (New
York: Psychology Press), 259–284.
Cowan, N. (2005). Working Mem-
ory Capacity. Hove, NY: Psychology
Press.
Cowan, N., Fristoe, N. M., Elliott, E.
M., Brunner, R. P., and Saults, J. S.
(2006). Scope of attention, control
of attention, and intelligence in chil-
dren and adults. Mem. Cognit. 34,
1754–1768.
Dienes, Z. (2008). Understanding Psy-
chology as a Science: An Introduction
to Scientific and Statistical Inference.
Palgrave Macmillan.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different:
the merits of unconscious thought
in preference development and deci-
sion making. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 87,
686–598.
Dijksterhuis, A., Bos, M. W., Nord-
gren, L. F., and van Baaren, R.
B. (2006). On making the right
choice: the deliberation-without-
attention effect. Science 311,
1005–1007.
Dijksterhuis,A., Bos, M. W., van der Leij,
A., and van Baaren, R. B. (2009). Pre-
dicting soccer matches after uncon-
scious and conscious thought as a
function of expertise. Psychol. Sci.
20, 1381–1387.
Dijksterhuis, A., and Nordgren, L. F.
(2006). A theory of unconscious
thought. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 1,
95–109.
Dijksterhuis, A., and van Olden, Z.
(2006). On the benefits of think-
ing unconsciously: unconscious
thought can increase post-choice
satisfaction. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 42,
627–631.
Förster, J., and Dannenberg, L. (2010).
GLOMOsys: a systems account of
global versus local processing. Psy-
chol. Inq. 21, 175–197.
Förster, J., and Denzler, M. (2012a).
When any Worx looks typical to
you: global relative to local pro-
cessing increases prototypicality and
liking. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 48,
416–419.
Förster, J., and Denzler, M. (2012b).
Sense creative! The impact of global
and local vision, hearing, touching,
tasting and smelling on creative and
analytic thought. Soc. Psychol. Per-
sonal. Sci. 3, 108–117.
Förster, J., and Higgins, E. T. (2005).
How global versus local perception
fits regulatory focus. Psychol. Sci. 16,
631–636.
Fredrickson, B. L., and Branigan, C.
(2005). Positive emotions broaden
the scope of attention and thought-
action repertoires. Cogn. Emot. 19,
313–332.
Gable, P., and Harman-Jones, E. (2010).
The blues broaden, but the nasty
narrows: attentional consequences
of negative affects low and high in
motivational intensity. Psychol. Sci.
21, 211–215.
Gasper, K., and Clore, G. (2002).
Attending to the big picture: mood
and global versus local processing of
visual information. Psychol. Sci. 13,
34–40.
Ham, J., van den Bos, K., and van
Doorn, E. (2009). Lady justice
thinks unconsciously: unconscious
thought can lead to more accurate
justice judgments. Soc. Cogn. 27,
510–522.
Hammond, K. R., Hamm, R. M., Gras-
sia, J., and Pearson, T. (1987).“Direct
comparison of the efficacy of intu-
itive and analytical cognition in
expert judgment,” in Proceedings of
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics SMC-17 (New Jer-
sey: IEEE Press), 753–770.
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and
Effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast
and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux.
Kahneman, D., and Klein, G. (2009).
Conditions for intuitive expertise: a
failure to disagree. Am. Psychol. 64,
515–526.
Klein, G. (2008). Naturalistic decision
making. Hum. Factors 50, 456–460.
Lamme, V. A. F. (2003). Why visual
awareness and attention are differ-
ent? Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 7,
12–18.
Lassiter, G. D., Lindberg, M. J.,
Gonzalez-Vallejo, C., Bellazza, F.
S., and Phillips, N. D. (2009).
The deliberation-without-attention
effect: evidence for an artifac-
tual interpretation. Psychol. Sci. 20,
671–675.
Lerouge, D. (2009). Evaluating the ben-
efits of distraction on product evalu-
ations: the mindset effect. J. Consum.
Res. 36, 367–379.
Liberman, N., and Förster, J. (2009).
Distancing from experienced self:
how global-versus-local perception
affects estimation of psychological
distance. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 97,
203–216.
Macrae, C. N., and Lewis, H. L.
(2002). Do I know you? Processing
orientation and face recognition.
Psychol. Sci. 13, 194–196.
McElree, B. (2006). “Accessing recent
events,” in The Psychology of Learn-
ing and Motivation, ed. B. H. Ross,
Vol. 46 (San Diego: Academic Press),
155–200.
Mukherjee, S., and Srinivasan, N.
(2013). Attention in preferen-
tial choice. Prog. Brain Res. 202,
117–134.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees –
precedence of global features in
visual-perception. Cogn. Psychol. 9,
353–383.
Newell, B. R., and Rakow, T. (2011).
Revising beliefs about the nature of
unconscious thought: evidence in
favor of null hypothesis. Soc. Cogn.
29, 711–726.
Newell, B. R., and Shanks, D. R. (in
press). Unconscious influences on
decision making: a critical review.
Behav. Brain Sci.
Newell, B. R., Wong, K. Y., Che-
ung, J. C. H., and Rakow, T.
(2009). Think, blink or sleep on
it? The impact of modes of
thought on complex decision mak-
ing. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. (Hove) 62,
707–732.
Nordgen, L. F., Bos, M. W., and Dijk-
sterhuis, A. (2011). The best of
both worlds: integrating conscious
and unconscious thought best solves
complex decisions. J. Exp. Soc. Psy-
chol. 47, 509–511.
Rey, A., Goldstein, R. M., and Per-
ruchet, P. (2009). Does uncon-
scious thought improve complex
decision making? Psychol. Res. 73,
372–379.
Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun,
D., Morey, R. D., and Iverson,
G. (2009). Bayesian t-tests for
accepting and rejecting the null
hypothesis. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 16,
225–237.
Shanks, D. R. (2006). Complex choices
better made unconsciously? Science
313, 760.
Simonson, I. (2005). In defense of con-
sciousness: the role of conscious
and unconscious inputs in con-
sumer choice. J. Consum. Psychol. 15,
211–217.
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 37 | 9
Srinivasan et al. Attentional scope influences decision processes
Sloman, S. A. (2002). “Two sys-
tems of reasoning,” in Heuristics
and Biases, eds T. Gilovich, D.
Griffin, and D. Kahneman (New
York: Cambridge University Press),
379–396.
Smith, E. E., and Jonides, J. (1998). Neu-
roimaging analysis of human work-
ing memory. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 95, 12061–12068.
Sprenger, A. M., Dougherty, M. R.,
Atkins, S. M., Franco-Watkins,
A. M., Thomas, R. P., Lange,
N., et al. (2011). Implications
of cognitive load for hypoth-
esis generation and probability
judgment. Front. Psychol. 2:129.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00129
Srinivasan, N. (2008). Interdependence
of attention and consciousness. Prog.
Brain Res. 168, 65–75.
Srinivasan, N., and Gupta, R. (2011).
Global-local processing affects
recognition of distracter emotional
faces. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. (Hove) 64,
425–433.
Srinivasan, N., and Hanif, A. (2010).
Global-happy and local-sad: per-
ceptual processing affects emo-
tion identification. Cogn. Emot. 24,
1062–1069.
Srinivasan, N., and Mukherjee, S.
(2010). Attribute preference
and selection in multi-attribute
decision making: implications
for unconscious and conscious
thought. Conscious. Cogn. 19,
644–652.
Srinivasan, N., Srivastava, P., Lohani, M.,
and Baijal, S. (2009). Focused and
distributed attention. Prog. Brain
Res. 176, 87–100.
Srivastava, P., and Srinivasan, N. (2010).
Time course of visual attention with
emotional faces. Atten. Percept. Psy-
chophys. 72, 369–377.
Stanovich, K. E., and West, R. F. (2002).
“Individual differences in reason-
ing: implications for the rational-
ity debate,” in Heuristics and Biases,
eds T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D.
Kahneman (New York: Cambridge
University Press), 421–440.
Strick, M., Dijksterhuis, A., and van
Baaren, R. B. (2010). Unconscious
thought effects take place off-
line, not on-line. Psychol. Sci. 21,
484–488.
Thorsteinson, T. J., and Withrow, S.
(2009). Does unconscious thought
outperform conscious thought
on complex decisions? A further
examination. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 4,
235–247.
Usher, M., Russo, Z., Weyers, M.,
Brauner, R., and Zakay, D. (2011).
The impact of mode of thought
in complex decisions: intuitive deci-
sions are better. Front. Psychol. 2:37.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00037
van Boxtel, J. J. A., Tsuchiya, N.,
and Koch, C. (2010). Conscious-
ness and attention: on sufficiency
and necessity. Front. Psychol. 1:217.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00217
Vogel, E. K., and Machizawa, M. G.
(2004). Neural activity predicts
individual differences in visual
working memory. Nature 428,
748–751.
Waroquier, L., Marchiori, D., Klein,
O., and Cleeremans, A. (2009).
Methodological pitfalls of the
unconscious thought para-
digm. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 4,
601–610.
Waroquier, L., Marchiori, D., Klein, O.,
and Cleeremans, A. (2010). Is it bet-
ter to think unconsciously or trust
your first impression? A reassess-
ment of unconscious thought the-
ory. Soc. Psychol. Personal. Sci. 1,
111–118.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 25 May 2012; accepted: 15 Jan-
uary 2013; published online: 04 February
2013.
Citation: Srinivasan N, Mukherjee S,
Mishra MV and Kesarwani S (2013)
Evaluating the role of attention in the
context of unconscious thought the-
ory: differential impact of attentional
scope and load on preference and
memory. Front. Psychology 4:37. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00037
This article was submitted to Frontiers in
Cognitive Science, a specialty of Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Srinivasan, Mukher-
jee, Mishra and Kesarwani. This is an
open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion License, which permits use, distrib-
ution and reproduction in other forums,
provided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 37 | 10
